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Abstract
Many anthropologists interpret neoliberalism as a radical break from and dangerous
rupture in post-war societies that featured Keynesian economic policies and welfare
provision. The allure of a mythic welfare state has boosted John Maynard Keynes’s
popularity to many who embrace certain facets of socialism. Many critical social scien-
tists have embraced Keynesianism in ways that overlook how the US used Keynesian
policies to reengineer and redeploy state power. Keynes’s liberal synthesis inspired
managers in the US Treasury Department to understand depression-era problems of
unemployment and poverty in ways that were consonant with the expansion of cor-
porate power. For understanding Keynesianism, as it actually existed during the Cold
War, we must analyse how the US Treasury and State Departments used Keynesian
principles to rebuild the social reproductive capacities necessary for capitalist accumu-
lation both domestically and in Western Europe. I focus on how the architects of post-
war capitalism used full employment policies, labour laws and welfare provision to
renovate the nexus of political practices and institutional structures in ways that
formed a benevolent and caring image of ‘the state’ and the myth of a class compro-
mise. Through these reforms, governmental planners and administrators used the ‘state
idea’ to reorganize capital accumulation as if the post-war economy would represent
ordinary people’s best interests. In the process, these sophisticated practices of power
became reified as the ‘welfare state’ and the ‘Keynesian compromise’ in ways that
endow these institutions and policies with a character divorced from practices of
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power. The post-war state embodied a dialectic of repression and reform that com-
bined criminalizing dissent with full employment policies and welfare provision. Taking
these aspects of power into account, we can see post-war Keynesianism in ways that
inspire a robust and far-reaching criticism of the contemporary predicament of eco-
nomic uncertainty, political instability and environmental degradation.
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Introduction
Many anthropologists and social scientists explain neoliberalism, and the increas-
ing dominance of multinational corporations and rising inequality, as a dangerous,
if not ominous rupture in western democracies. A few scholars have studied the
continuities between post-war structures of capitalist accumulation and contem-
porary forms of economic power, trying to theorize the relationship between these
historical phases of capitalism (e.g. Baca, 2004, 2010, 2017; Neveling, 2017). For
the most part, social critics have embraced narratives that presents neoliberalism as
either a ‘crisis’ or ‘rupture’ in post-war capitalism’s ‘class compromise’ (e.g.
Dumenil and Levy, 2004; Harvey, 2007; Ong, 2006).1 Loı̈c Wacquant (2012), for
instance, criticizes Marxists for accepting the belief that neoliberalism represents a
declining and weakening of the state. Wacquant points out that the state’s expan-
sion of repressive powers represents a defining characteristic of neoliberalism in the
US. Unfortunately, Wacquant undermines his criticism by deepening the myth of
what he calls the ‘Fordist–Keynesian pact’. Ringing alarm bells, Wacquant warns
that neoliberalism represents a rupture that has reengineered and redeployed ‘the
state as the core agency that sets the rules and fabricates the subjectivities, social
relations and collective representations suited to realising markets’ (Wacquant,
2012: 66). By taking post-war capitalism’s ideal of a class accord for granted,
Wacquant, along with many of the Marxists he criticizes, buries the structures
of domination essential to the so-called golden age of Keynesian capitalism.
Over the past few years, the post-war welfare state’s allure has boosted John
Maynard Keynes’ popularity among a growing number of self-described socialist
politicians like Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio Cortez. Geoff Mann recent-
ly pointed out the irony that the biggest hero for this new variety of socialism is a
‘bourgeois British capitalist’ who ‘felt little solidarity for workers and inspired a
century of establishment economics’ (Mann, 2019; e.g. Crotty, 2019). Moreover,
this enthusiasm for Keynesianism overlooks how the US, as it led Western Europe
during the Cold War, used Keynesianism to reengineer and redeploy state power.
Much the way Wacquant describes neoliberal authorities, officials in the Roosevelt
and Truman administrations used Keynesian policies to set new economic rules.
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They used the principles of this ‘new’ liberalism to reshape political subjectivities,
form new social relations and fashion collective representations to rebuild capital-
ism and institute global markets. As Stephen Collier points out, neoliberalism is
part of a history of liberalism, which he defines as a practice representing new
modes of understanding and intervening in politics (Collier, 2011: 18). Similarly,
Keynesianism exemplified a critical method of intervention that state managers
used decisively to transform politics in ways that would ultimately shape the rise of
neoliberalism.
Rather than developing concepts that could protect workers from capitalism’s
predations, Keynes critically reflected on government practice to rescue
‘Civilization’ from the faulty logic of what he called ‘classical economics’.
Instead of inspiring workers, he motivated American financial planners.
Keynes’s ideas were appealing to the American officials because they diagnosed
the problems of unemployment, poverty and contracting markets in ways that
were consonant with the industrial expansion and its vital structure, the corpora-
tion. Keynes developed policies and mechanisms that addressed problems stem-
ming from accumulation cycles of contraction and expansion in terms of social
reproduction. As many scholars have criticized narrow readings of the Marxist
concept of mode of production, capitalist production depends upon a complex
structure of institutions, social relationships and infrastructure (Bhattacharya,
2017; Fraser, 2014; Mezzadri, 2019). Keynes highlighted many critical imperatives
for socially reproducing capitalist society in ways that often befuddled corporate
leaders. Capitalists, investors and entrepreneurs rarely understand the necessary
institutions, arrangements and infrastructure for stable economic development and
growth. Different analysts situate these conflicts in varying sets of contradictions
between the activities and interests of specific investors in production and the
broader political question of reproduction (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Friedman,
1994; Miliband, 1969). Simultaneously, national policies for managing accumula-
tion cycles occur in a global structure of capitalism. Social reproduction requires
political mechanisms and structures that connect various localities, countries and
regions into a system of interdependence through imperial projects (Bhambra and
Holmwood, 2018; Stoler, 2006; Stoler and McGranahan, 2007).
In terms of social reproduction, which joins the household with institutional
structures, political power and multilateral power, we can better understand post-
war Keynesianism. Keynesian economic principles addressed crucial questions
about managing social reproduction, connecting the domestic reorganization of
capitalism to global structures to manage capital accumulation, expand markets
and procure raw materials. In this way, Keynesianism formed a practical method
for extending state power into the realm of economics (Mitchell, 2011). Keynes
criticized classical economics for its belief in self-regulating markets. He was espe-
cially critical of how mainstream economists neglected the careful management of
capitalism in ways that would ultimately fail to sustain ‘Western Civilization’.
Post-war Keynesianism represented expertise crucial for reorganizing social repro-
ductive mechanisms that would stabilize capitalism at a time of ‘crisis’. Rather
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than grandiose plans for social revolution, Keynes sought to uncover the relatively
small, technical problems that produced the distressing economic problems of the
Great Depression. Crucially, he focused on behaviours and policies that militated
against long-term investment and encouraged investors to take money from the
industrial circuit of capital accumulation for either the safe-haven of savings or
avenues for financial speculation. Accordingly, Keynes designed policies that
would subordinate finance capital to the needs of long-term investment in produc-
tion that he believed would circumvent the contractions that produced the
Depression and recurring crises of underconsumption and unemployment.
For understanding Keynesianism, as it actually existed during the Cold War, we
must analyse how the US used Keynesian policies to build post-war capitalism. In
this sense, Keynes’s most spectacular accomplishment was also a personal defeat.
Planners in the Treasury Department used many of his ideas to rout him in
negotiations over Lend-Lease and Bretton Woods, which guaranteed Britain’s
subordination to the US (Steil, 2013). With the resurgence of the Depression in
1937, Keynes’s masterpiece The General Theory of Employment, Interest and
Money (1936) inspired officials in the Roosevelt administration. With a new under-
standing of ‘effective demand’, economic planners refocused New Deal programs
from reactive ‘relief’ programs to an aggressive policy approach that would attack
the sources of the economic slump (Collins, 1981). In this way, the American
Keynesians advanced policies to contain unemployment through methods that
augmented corporations’ disproportionate influence in social and political life.
These enterprises increasingly dominated vital sectors of industrial, financial and
commercial life.
As the Keynesians in the Treasury Department became master custodians of
corporate power, liberal ideologues developed euphemisms of ‘class compromise’
and ‘mixed economy’ to legitimize the massive expansion of corporate power as if
it were a kinder, more tempered capitalism. Unfortunately, many critics of neo-
liberalism have accepted these Cold War neologisms. Philip Abrams, however,
reminds us that ‘the state’ is not the reality that stands behind the mask of politics.
Instead, it is ‘the mask’ that prevents us from ‘seeing political practice as it is’
(Abrams, [1977] 1988). Underneath the myths of class compromise, we can see how
American Keynesians used full employment policies, social protections, labour
laws and welfare provision to renovate the nexus of political practices and insti-
tutional structures. At the same time, they successfully presented their capitalist
innovation in benevolent images of ‘the state’. Through these reforms, governmen-
tal planners and administrators used the ‘state idea’ to project and purvey indus-
trial corporations as if they represented ordinary people’s best interests. In the
process, practices of power became reified as ‘the welfare state’ and ‘the
Keynesian compromise’ in ways that endowed these forms of control with a
social character divorced from its practices, reimagined as a hard-fought ‘compro-
mise’ between workers and capital.2
Central to the New Deal and Keynesian full employment policies—which is
crucial for understanding contemporary forms of ‘neoliberal’ domination—the
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state expanded repressive institutions that contributed to McCarthyism’s marshal-
ling of fear of putative communist infiltration of American democracy. Keynesian
economic policies and welfare provisions grew from the grounds of class conflict
that featured secret policing and domestic security agencies like the FBI and MI5.
Increasing criminalization of political dissent developed along with practices that
integrated workers into capitalist accumulation as mass consumers. A critical and
historically grounded analysis of Keynesianism can contribute to a robust and far-
reaching criticism of the contemporary predicament of economic uncertainty,
political instability and environmental degradation. Rather than seeing the massive
power of multinational corporations, the undemocratic rule of multilateral insti-
tutions and the prominent role of US military power as examples of neoliberalism’s
rupture, this paper shows these to be continuous with Keynesianism of the post-
war period.
John Maynard Keynes: Restoring class power
John Maynard Keynes contributed to post-war capitalism’s expansion in ways that
had little to do with either strengthening the working class or combatting inequal-
ity. As a self-described bourgeois scholar, he became distressed by how World War
I had damaged the economic mechanisms of production and trade that had pro-
duced Western Civilization. In organizing the finances of Britain’s war efforts,
Keynes became increasingly disillusioned with the scale at which western powers
had wasted resources and destroyed human life. He deplored politicians’ inability
to negotiate a settlement that could end the destruction threatening the bourgeois
values he held dear (Ahamed, 2009; Skidelsky, 1992). The Paris Peace Conference
increased his disenchantment as he witnessed Allied leaders, with moralistic fer-
vour, punish Germany while ignoring the logistics for rebuilding the economy.
Upon resigning from the Treasury, he dismissed the Treaty of Versailles as a
‘Carthaginian Peace’. In The Economic Conditions of the Peace (1919), Keynes
blasted the Allied Powers for their short-sightedness:
The Treaty includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of Europe—noth-
ing to make the defeated Central Empires into good neighbors, nothing to stabilise
the new States of Europe, nothing to reclaim Russia; nor does it promote in any way a
compact of economic solidarity amongst the Allies themselves; no arrangement was
reached at Paris for restoring the disordered finances of France and Italy, or to adjust
the systems of the Old World and the New. ([1919] 2019: 174)
Keynes asserted that the lack of concern for rebuilding market relations and the
European financial system grew from the failure to realize the ‘intensely unusual,
unstable, complicated, unreliable, temporary nature’ of Western Europe’s econom-
ic organization. Dangers to ‘Civilization’ grew from naive understandings of cap-
italism that assumed ‘the most peculiar and temporary of our late advantages as
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natural, permanent, and to be depended on, and we lay our plans accordingly’
(Keynes, [1919] 2019: 45).
Over the next two decades, Keynes doggedly replaced what he described as the
false foundations of ‘classical economics’ with ‘scientific knowledge’ to establish
policies that could reproduce stable institutions. Keynes’s focus on ‘Civilization’ as
the central concern for economics drew from Edmund Burke. He credited the
famous conservative with framing ‘one of the finest problems in legislation,
namely, to determine what the State ought to take upon itself to direct by the
public wisdom, and what it ought to leave, with as little interference as possible, to
individual exertion’ (Keynes, [1931] 1963: 312–313). Keynes used Burkean princi-
ples to guide the way he addressed the state’s role in addressing economic disorder
to strengthen the institutions of private property, liberal trade and the legal frame-
work of contracts (Skidelsky, 2003). Rather than being moved to ‘wrath’ by a ‘fiery
passion for justice and equality’, Keynes was driven by ‘an impatience with how
badly society was managed’ (Skidelsky, 1992: 3).
With The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), Keynes
authoritatively addressed the narrow causes of slumps and unemployment. He
audaciously announced himself a ‘revolutionary’ as he labelled his predeces-
sors––Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Alfred Marshall and his colleague Arthur
Pigou––‘classical economists’ who built their theories upon the faulty logic of
‘Say’s Law’ (Laidler, 1999). Keynes simplified the French Physiocrat’s argument
as ‘supply creates its own demand’ to expose the fundamental flaw that rendered
classical economists incapable of foreseeing situations where demand for goods
and services would fall below supply. As an alternative to, and seemingly oblivious
of, the Marxist concern with overproduction crises, Keynes sought ways to turn
demand into a force that would decisively boost the magnitude of capitalist pro-
duction. Keynes used the sudden reduction of the demand for goods and plummet-
ing investment during the Depression to highlight how investment and spending
represented capitalism’s driving economic force. The simultaneous overproduction
and underconsumption of goods led Keynes to develop mechanisms that would
expand ‘effective demand’ to initiate capitalism’s recovery (Keynes, 1936).
Increasing demand for goods and services would release the market’s dynamic
powers, leading businesses to invest aggressively in production, illustrating the
dual effects of employment: bringing to life both idle capital and idle labour. In
dispensing the Victorian ideal of thrift, he argued that raising consumption would
provide a stable foundation for capitalist investment.
Like most bourgeois economists, Keynes identified the entrepreneur as the
engine of prosperity and entrepreneurial ‘investment demand’—the capitalist’s
desire to take advantage of ‘productive investment’—as the source of economic
expansion (Mann, 2017: 199). Consequently, Keynes formulated methods that
would encourage entrepreneurs to invest in capital expansion rather than retreat
to the refuge of savings. In promoting long-term capital investment, Keynes
wanted to manage markets in ways that subordinated financial capital to the
necessary conditions for ‘productive’ investment. Without proper controls,
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Keynes argued that speculative capital could undermine society’s moral bases by
allowing speculators to profit from luck unfairly. In pointing out finance capital’s
tremendous capacity to inflate risk, Keynes warned that ‘speculators’ might not do
much harm as ‘bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise’. However, the position
becomes ‘serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of specula-
tion. When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the
activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done’ (1936: 159).
In developing the concept of effective demand, Keynes brilliantly incorporated
the working classes, and their struggles for dignity, into the expanding agenda for
capital accumulation. Rather than supporting the Labour Party or trade unions,
he identified labour’s importance to economic policy. Expanding employment and
consumption would secure the conditions for capital accumulation. For the imper-
atives of economic growth, Keynes brilliantly recognized that laborers, as consum-
ers, had been an unrealized source for profits. Full employment policies integrated
workers according to the strategies for expanding capital and raising output. With
such a focus on boosting productivity, Keynes developed a view of democracy that
narrowed its scope to the needs of improving capitalist techniques.
The Keynesian transformation of US power
To understand Keynes’ influence in shaping post-war capitalism more critically,
we must look at how US officials incorporated his economic principles. Keynes’s
concept of effective demand critically analysed capitalism’s failures and offered an
alternative that would incorporate the vigour of class struggle into institutions of
the state. Taking inspiration from this view, ‘a fervent band of “young
Keynesians”’—including Lauchlin Currie and Harry Dexter White—began to per-
suade sceptics like President Roosevelt and Treasury Secretary Harry Morgenthau
about the advantages of Keynesianism (Skidelsky, 2003: 625–626). The General
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money inspired this emerging generation of
economists to address the causes of the global slump. Keynesianism provided an
analytic frame to understand the wicked pairing of declining investment and plum-
meting demand for goods in ways that considered American capitalism’s faulty
organization. This new viewpoint recognized that the focus of New Deal programs
on ‘relief’ did not address the causes of sluggish capital investment. Rather than
‘relief’ to ‘the poor’, American Keynesians came to understand public spending as
an aggressive policy tool that could initiate recovery (Collins, 1981: 6). Against the
ravages of the resurgent economic slump, the Roosevelt administration started
introducing Keynesian macroeconomic tools of deficit spending and public
works projects to invigorate the New Deal by instilling capitalist organizations
with new powers of the national government.
World War II provided the pivotal boost that catapulted American manufactur-
ing and business to previously unimagined output levels. With gigantic orders for
munitions, military equipment and provisions, business leaders discarded some of
their fears of state intervention. Entrepreneurs entered into government service and
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joined the Keynesian chorus by celebrating war-related Keynesian policies for ‘its
prodigious feats of production’, legitimating Keynesian institutions and establish-
ing a new configuration of cooperation between business and government. With
new incentives to expand capitalization, entrepreneurs and enterprises formed ‘new
groups in the shadowy areas where the private and public spheres intersected’
(Collins, 1981: 81).
The expansion of American industrial capacity required new approaches to
international policy. Keynesians became aware that industrial expansion would
require novel political mechanisms to ensure the growth of global markets.
Treasury planners felt a sense of urgency to confront Europe’s colonial system
and its policies of ‘imperial preferences’ for thwarting American businesses from
freely trading through large parts of the world. In 1939, as the British struggled to
defend itself against Nazi Germany, the US used the crisis to increase its position
vis-a-vis the British Imperial trading system. When the British requested financial
assistance, the US attached conditions that would initiate dismantling its colonial
structure. Against World War II’s common lore as the great struggle for democ-
racy, the US entered these negotiations without any felt obligation to help save
Western democracy. Instead, Treasury officials conditioned Britain’s financial sur-
vival on Article VII, which required the British to eliminate ‘all forms of discrim-
inatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and
other trade barriers’ (cited in Steil, 2013: 14).
In ending imperial preferences, Britain lost its privileged access to its colonies’
markets, providing the US a dominant position and stripping Britain of its tradi-
tional export rights (Steil, 2013: 107). The British authorities understood
Lend-Lease as a ‘mortal threat to British solvency and sovereignty’. In losing its
privileged access to the markets of its colonies and dominions, Britain would
become increasingly dependent on US imports––a devastating blow to a war-
ravaged nation, which Churchill later described as the ‘most sordid act in history’
(Steil, 2013: 13–14). Lend-Lease was pivotal in global politics. It laid the first steps of
the process that anthropologist Stephen Reyna describes as American imperialism
reducing Western Europe to ‘second tiered’ status vis-a-vis the US (Reyna, 2016:
118–119), making Britain dependent on American economic power. For many years,
the Treasury Department would use Lend-Lease to ‘press the British relentlessly for
financial and trade concessions that would eliminate Britain as an economic and
political rival in the postwar landscape’ (Steil, 2013: 108).
In response to Lend-Lease’s devastating effects on Britain’s global stature,
Keynes began drawing up a ‘detailed blueprint for a new global system––one
that would offer Britain a measure of protection against American monetary
and trade diktat’ (Steil, 2013: 137). Under the new conditions of ‘cooperation’
established by Lend-Lease, Keynes came to the negotiating table ‘with the mission
of conserving what he could of bankrupt Britain’s historic imperial prerogatives’.
He realized there would be scant room for political manoeuvre within a ‘dollar-
dominated postwar world’ (Steil, 2013: 3). Economist Michael Roberts (2017)
succinctly describes Keynes’s about-face: Keynes, the great ‘idealist of civilisation
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turned into a pragmatist at the post-war Bretton Woods meetings, representing not
the world’s masses, or even of a democratic world order, but the narrow national
interests of British imperialism against American dominance’ (Roberts, 2017).
Harry Dexter White, Keynes’s foil in the Bretton Woods negotiations, was a
leading advocate for Keynesianism in the US Treasury. Such admiration for
Keynes’s technical abilities extended neither to personal liking nor to the support
of the demands he made on Britain’s behalf (Skidelsky, 2003: 625). As Steil
describes,
White’s role as the chief architect of Bretton Woods, where he outmaneuvered his far
more brilliant but willfully ingenuous British counterpart, marks him as an unrelent-
ing nationalist, seeking to extract every advantage out of the tectonic shift in
American and British geopolitical circumstances put in motion by the Second
World War. White had a vision of a postwar order antithetic to long-standing
British interests, particularly as they related to the empire. (2013: 5)
US officials presented such antagonistic approaches to reorganizing interna-
tional politics in reformist rhetoric. They promised to extend a ‘New Deal for a
New World’ and offered an alternative to the colonialism of ‘Old Europe’.
A dialectic of reform and repression
While the US Treasury Department was reorganizing its relationship with Britain
and Western European powers, authorities generated new forms of violence
domestically. In discussing how the New Deal and Keynesian reforms transformed
the US, we must consider the context of repression and the proliferation of domes-
tic security forces that shaped reform. During World War I, the federal govern-
ment increasingly criminalized political dissent through the Espionage and
Sedition Acts. As the government fashioned images of domestic threats to the
nation, it expanded security institutions in the form of the Bureau of
Investigation (BI)––later to become the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)––
and implemented wide-ranging censorship and surveillance (Luff, 2017). The rise
of Soviet power became the pretext for policymakers to intensify their conflict with
organized labour. Government officials and business leaders increasingly imagined
labour leadership collaborating with Russia to overthrow the government, leading
to the belief that labour militancy was a ‘red menace’. As Mark Mazower argues,
the Bolshevik Revolution became ‘a permanent justification for expanding polit-
ical policing work in capitalist societies’ (1997: 244; cited in Luff, 2017).
Congressional scrutiny facilitated the government’s foray into policing politics.
Congressmembers worked with the BI’s General Intelligence Department to
launch the Palmer Raids, which symbolized the government’s war against the
radical movement (Schmidt, 2004). When the Red Scare had dissipated in the
1920s, anti-radicalism became a crucial institutional and bureaucratic feature in
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the US government, leaving a weakened and disorganized labour movement in its
wake.
Though the labour movement continued during the early 1930s, governmental
repression following the Russian Revolution debilitated its opposition to
American business and industrialists. The appearance of a weak and quiescent
labour movement vanished suddenly in 1934. Labour activists used New Deal
programs and Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s democratic rhetoric and calls for
expanding economic opportunity to mobilize an unexpected outburst of militancy.
Workers began to consider the federal government as responsive to their interests.
Breaking from the demoralization of the first years of the Depression, protests,
strikes and clashes with companies, and their security forces, spread across the
country, resulting in violent confrontations in Flint, Minneapolis, Toledo, San
Francisco and other industrial and mining sites. Ideologically committed radicals
led thousands of militants in mostly successful clashes with employers and local
government authorities (Lichtenstein, 2003: 9–10).
Bloody conflicts contradicted the New Deal’s promise to ‘restore American
politics’ through a more inclusive democracy. Labour’s precipitous militancy trig-
gered fear among elite politicians and policymakers who self-defined as ‘progres-
sives’ and were committed to the New Deal rhetoric of renewing American
democracy. Senator Robert Wagner led the way. He used the violent clashes to
chart a new path to engage ‘the rising tide of industrial discontent’ through the
National Labor Reform Act of 1935 (NLRA). The NLRA promised to correct the
‘inequality of bargaining power’ between workers and employers by granting trade
unions the power to unionize, collectively bargain and strike. Known as the
Wagner Act, these laws came to symbolize conciliation between labour and capital.
Many critics of neoliberalism accept this legislation as a working-class victory and
an expression of labour unions’ considerable power. However, the bill represented
the progressive-era tradition by implementing reforms that would make industrial
sectors more efficient. On a strategic level, Wagner’s initiative understood that
‘legal symbols’ would influence workers’ consciousness, going beyond pacification
and galvanize their commitment to the industrial order. The new legislation gave
workers an avenue in seeking collective empowerment in ways that would secure
their consent and cooperation with American enterprise and its development of
mass production (Barenberg, 1993: 1381). Through the NLRA, the federal gov-
ernment made class conflict mediation an institutional feature of its recovery
efforts. As the newly formed Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) super-
seded the American Federation of Labor (AFL), a new generation of labour
leaders took on political roles, as unions became institutions for economic recovery
(Blyth, 2002). After the passage of the Wagner Act, the CIO became noteworthy
supporters of the State and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, claiming more than four
million members in all the major industrial sectors.
Central to this mode of integrating labour into capital accumulation was what
political scientist Mark Blyth describes as an ‘underconsumptionist understanding
of the depression’. Much like arguments for the Social Security Act, advocates for
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the Wagner Act put forth a Keynesian view that the bill would increase purchasing
power and drive up industrial output (Blyth, 2002: 66). As the Wagner Act states,
‘the inequality of bargaining power between employees . . . and employers . . . tends
to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the
purchasing power of wage earners in industry’ (cited in Blyth, 2002: 67–68).
Through labour reform, the state gave the labour movement new forms of orga-
nization that bestowed labour protections as part of an industrial growth strategy
that boosted consumer demand and stimulated consumerism.
The radical patina that these reforms enjoy among contemporary social critics
partially derives from how business leaders and right-wing groups opposed the
Wagner Act and other New Deal initiatives. Industrialists and corporate managers
often denounced the reforms as a socialist plot to erode democracy and property
rights. Taking this resistance at face value, many American scholars have inter-
preted the Wagner Act as appeasing labour, thereby turning state power against
capitalist prerogatives and preferences in ways that favoured workers (see Skocpol,
1980; Plotke, 1996). This interpretation does not adequately analyse the nature of
the conflicts between state managers and capital. The Wagner Act emerged from a
more profound concern for what Marxists call social reproduction. Advocates of
the New Deal among the Democratic political elite understood the long-term need
to stabilize economic conditions. As Keynes pointed out, capitalists were often
conscious of their interests in the narrowest terms. They often followed their
passions in ways that undermined the long-term social reproduction of capitalist
relations. New Dealers and Keynesians, as managers of the state apparatus, had a
broader understanding of what was necessary for the social reproduction of cap-
italist relations. Their power rested upon maintaining the political and economic
order (Miliband, 1969). As Mario Tronti points out, Keynesianism of the New
Deal was not a revolution ‘against capital’s structures’ as much as it was a ‘political
initiative from above’ that invested capitalist institutions with a ‘new strategy’
(Tronti, [1966] 2019: 317). New Deal social reforms increased the state, and ulti-
mately capital’s, control over labour. In providing rights, the Wagner Act con-
strained labour––along with the 1935 Social Security Act––in that its provisions
reinforced the market’s discipline of labour within limited benefits and many con-
ditions for eligibility (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 59–60). In this way, labour laws
fused with growth policies to subordinate labour to the dominant corporations’
imperatives.
The combination of Keynesian economic policy and welfare provision consti-
tuted innovative forms of power. These reforms reinforced and complemented
domestic security institutions’ expanding capabilities from World War I and the
Red Scare, embodying a dialectic of reform and repression. The New Deal’s ideal
of change and desire for greater governmental efficiency expanded into the realm
of domestic security. Leadership in the BI, which was renamed the FBI in 1935,
employed the New Deal’s modernizing ethos to increase the centralization of its
policing efforts and to raise its political importance and prestige. Along with wel-
fare protections, the federal government redoubled its domestic security efforts by
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expanding the FBI’s surveillance programs against what authorities believed was
an increasing threat of communism. The FBI collected information on people
working in every major industry as part of its broad mandate to halt communist
infiltration of labour organizations (Powers, 1987). Underneath the federal gov-
ernment’s pronouncement of democratic renewal, J Edgar Hoover directed the
FBI to arrest, intern and deport thousands of suspected subversives while furnish-
ing the executive branch with more than ‘2,600 reports’ of communist activities
(Schmidt, 2004: 342). Just as A Mitchell Palmer promoted the domestic intelligence
officers as objective experts of radical subversion during the Red Scare, the
Roosevelt administration promoted the FBI as a responsible and fair party con-
trolling the communist threat (Schmidt, 2004: 354). In this new iteration of the Red
Scare, Senator Joseph McCarthy became J Edgar Hoover’s partner.
Labour leaders gradually looked past the repressive aspects of expanding fede-
ral power and celebrated New Deal policies for providing workers higher wages
and job security. Indeed, the federal government expanded control by using labour
leaders to fight communism. During the 1920s, the American Federal Labor Union
(AFL) solidified itself as an ally in the government’s fight against communism. The
‘conservative officials of the AFL were the vanguard of American anticommunism
in the interwar period’. From the first days of the Bolshevik Revolution, AFL
leadership ‘evangelized against communism’ and ‘collaborated with the federal
government’s repression of communists (Luff, 2013: 102–103). As the CIO came
to the forefront, it replaced the AFL as the dominant force leading the labour
movement. With the Cold War and the Marshall Plan, authorities steadily pushed
communists out of the CIO as both unions converged to participate in the anti-
communist offensive. Rather than merely being co-opted, unions became an essen-
tial aspect of the state apparatus––internalizing Keynesian ideals. Historian
Jennifer Luff argues that during the ‘little Red Scare of 1939–1941, labor conser-
vatives of the AFL helped erect the legal architecture of federal anticommunism
and McCarthyism’ (2013: 103–104). Simultaneously, the CIO ‘gradually divested
itself of its radical heritage and democratic procedure’ (Van der Pijl, 2012: 150).
Eventually, the two unions would merge to establish the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions as its leaders claimed a position in the
Cold War battle against communism.
During World War II, the federal government expanded Keynesian economic
policies to increase the militarization of industry. Enlarging the reach of the
National Labor Relations Board’s previous efforts, the War Production Board
increased and intensified the federal government’s role in managing labour. One
could see this as solidifying the state’s commitment to directing industries toward
public purposes––which dwarfed the scale and the long-term impact of New Deal
programs like the National Recovery Administration. However, this policy
focused on military power in troubling ways. The CIO’s consent to the emerging
warfare state subordinated its membership to the expansion of military industries
and a newly developing arrangement that tied state agencies and corporate
America closer, in ways that would facilitate Cold War policies. Labour leaders
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believed that by allying with the Roosevelt wing of the Democratic Party, and its
commitment to military-based industrial expansion, they could advance their inter-
ests and those of their working-class constituency, moving society in a broadly
social-democratic direction (Lichtenstein, 2003: 82–83). Under these conditions,
war mobilization routinized union activity in ways that diminished the power of
rank-and-file members while expanding the institutional role of union leadership,
which consented to the more significant intervention of the federal government
into union affairs (Lichtenstein, 2003). The economy’s militarization co-opted
workers to the war industry, aligning workers’ interests with war profiteering.
Taken together, post-war forms of capitalist relations destroyed the militant
labour movement. They transformed the labour movement into a productive
and active factor of capitalist growth and legitimizing the militarized state
(Brenner, 2006: 82).
Many writers credit these developments with fostering a ‘new labour movement’
as the basis for building a ‘new democratic order’ (e.g. Blyth, 2002; Plotke, 1996).
There were parallel processes in Europe, especially in Bismarckian Germany,
where the state used welfare provision to control labour and complement policing
of dissent (Beck, 1997; Clark, 2012; Steinmetz, 1993). Instead of theorizing this
dialectic of reform and repression, many critics of neoliberalism take democracy
for granted. They do not question the realities of power embodied in growth pol-
itics and the ways that military-fuelled consumerism contributed to reorganizing
labour politics. Under the military-industrial complex’s growing force, Keynesian
social engineering created new political subjects and subjected people to new ways
of being governed (Mitchell, 2011). With an institutional role for organized labour,
these economic policies redefined ‘democracy’ in ways that made the economy the
central feature of state power. With a focus on raising wages to expand effective
demand, Keynesian growth policies transformed how the working classes partic-
ipated in capitalist accumulation, which limited working-class politics to purely
economic needs (Van Der Pijl, 2012: 150). Based on this new accumulation model,
welfare state policies became productive in making labour central to economics as
consumers. In this way, the Keynesian project imposed power upon working clas-
ses in ways that made them more docile and increasingly committed to capitalism
through consumerism.
The Marshall Plan: Militarizing Keynesianism
With the end of World War II, the US Treasury Department envisioned a ‘new’
Europe that would become integral to building its liberal order. Department
officials aimed to establish trade mechanisms that could enlarge global markets
for American industrial goods and a friendly environment for overseas invest-
ment, which officials euphemized as the ‘open door’. Continuing where Lend-
Lease left off, the US sought to restructure Western European states in ways
that would integrate Europe into a global system of multilateral trade
(Cardwell, 2011). For this purpose, the US distributed billions of dollars in
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grants and loans for rebuilding Europe. Most governments used these loans for
expedient methods to stave off emergencies as they had little chance to embark
upon comprehensive plans for reconstruction or a long-term investment. Instead
of an ‘open door’ to American products and capital, protectionist blocs per-
sisted. The Truman administration cancelled the Lend-Lease agreement, sending
Britain toward what Keynes called an ‘economic Dunkirk’, contributing to an
increasingly dire situation characterized by economic weakness and social tur-
moil. These problems came to a head when Britain, economically exhausted,
pulled its support from the Greek government in its civil war with communists.
By 1947, the State Department began to step into the breach left by the Bretton
Woods agreement’s shortcomings. Officials feared that Greece’s civil war could
unleash the spread of socialism throughout the continent. Moreover, they recog-
nized that the US’ bilateral approaches to Europe’s economic trouble had failed,
and the Bretton Woods System was inadequate to halt a trade deficit that had
doubled in just one year since 1946 (Judt, 2006). Under the Truman Doctrine’s
umbrella, Secretary of State George Marshall established the European Recovery
Program (ERP) to shield the continent from communism. Embodying Keynesian
logic, the ERP shifted focus from relief efforts to the recovery of economic pro-
ductivity and increasing output. Paradoxical to pre-Keynesian thinking, US aid
was concerned with making European businesses and corporations more compet-
itive. Without such improvement, Europe would not develop into a viable market
for American exports. As Europe’s financial crisis deepened, it became probable
that European leaders would seek recourse in nationalist policies, restricting
American imports. This could limit the participation of Western Europe in inter-
national trade. The Marshall Plan’s ambitious objective was to ‘correct the massive
structural disequilibrium in world trade by rebuilding Europe and Japan’s indus-
trial heartlands and restore their economic ties with primary producing areas in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America’ (Callinicos, 2009: 171). By improving European
capital’s competitiveness internationally, European businesses could earn enough
dollars to balance trade on a multilateral basis, slow down inflation and increase
industrial productivity (Block, 1977: 88).
Reengineering Western Europe’s domestic policies through the Marshall Plan
reduced American allies to what Stephen Reyna (2016: 119) calls a ‘second-tier of
countries’, subordinate to the ‘imperial core of the United States’. Though Western
European regimes retained considerable power as ‘second-tier states’ of the
Atlantic Community, they would have to
operate in ways consistent with US public delires. They are for capitalism—their own
and that of America—and they will defend this world with violence if necessary.
Because of their privileged position in the New American Empire, these states
might be termed ‘advantaged clients’. (Reyna, 2016: 119)
Along these lines, Western European leaders turned to the US’ economic and
military power to facilitate their liberal projects. In this respect, the US constructed
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its empire in Europe through ‘invitation’, making its project distinctly liberal in its
structure and substance (Latham, 1997: 112). The ERP framed the conditions for
accepting aid as the movement toward balanced budgets, financial stability and
stabilization of exchange rates; all focused on the agenda of knocking down bar-
riers to liberal and multilateral trade. Moreover, the US required that recipient
countries, for every dollar of Marshall Plan aid, would place an equal amount of
domestic currency in a fund to be used only for purposes approved by the US
government (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 96).
In concentrating Marshall Plan aid on private capital and corporations, the US
Congress stipulated that the State Department set up the Economic Cooperation
Administration (ECA) to administer these programs. Emphasizing private busi-
ness’s role, the ECA promoted corporate and bourgeois members of society
instead of governmental powers (Latham, 1997: 169). The ECA often used private
channels rather than governments to procure resources. Moreover, business rep-
resentatives, mostly corporate leaders, directed advisory committees that had cru-
cial policymaking functions reorganizing European political and economic
structures. Business leaders engaged in unambiguous campaigns to strengthen
national economies and international commerce according to the American model.
In supporting corporate leaders and the liberal transformation of the European
governments, the Marshall Plan militated against communist parties, laying the
foundations for Cold War containment policies. In de-emphasizing coercion and
force, the Marshall plan backgrounded the military and the CIA to the more funda-
mental Keynesian impulse to generate economic growth. State Department planners
recognized the working classes and their grievances with the status quo in designing
corporate growth models that would integrate working classes into capitalist produc-
tion in ways that would raise wages. Working with Social Democratic parties, State
Department officials balanced their liberalization strategies and ‘financial restraint’ to
accommodate the priorities of rebuilding the social infrastructure. In this way,
American planners used Marshall Plan funds to underwrite Western European
allies as ‘capitalist states’ while at the same time making it possible to secure coop-
eration from labour. They prioritized economic growth to produce ever-increasing
wealth instead of economic redistribution (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 97). Various
programs and aid packages sought to raise productivity and to implement moderate
reforms in ways that could isolate communist unions and political parties. In diver-
gent ways, the AFL and CIO––with CIA funding––contributed to developing anti-
communist and conservative trade unions in Europe (Van Der Pijl, 2012).
The minimal character of the ERP made it incapable of addressing Europe’s
acute political and economic problems. To make Western Europe successful in an
open world economy would require structural changes that transcended the
Marshall Plan’s capabilities. By 1950, it became clear that the Marshall plan
could not profoundly transform the European corporate structure or develop
the efficient planning mechanisms that would integrate European countries
through liberal trade. With this imminent failure, the US soberly faced the possi-
bility of losing its European export market (Block, 1977: 92). As with the New
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Deal in 1937, the State Department’s reform efforts in Europe would turn to
militarization as offering the economic engine necessary for recovery. When ten-
sion increased with the Soviet Union, caused by its successes in developing nuclear
capabilities, Truman asked the National Security Council (NSC) to review US
foreign policy in light of the Soviet atomic program’s rapid progress. Paul Nitze,
director of the Policy Planning Staff, wrote a report that foretold of impending
confrontation with the Soviet Union that would require the US ‘to assume uni-
laterally the defense of the free world at a tremendous price and without hesitation’
(cited in Fletcher, 2016: 750). Working with Secretary of State Dean Acheson,
Nitze used the rising showdown as a pretext for a rearmament program in the
US and Europe. Military industries would become the motor for the political and
economic transformation of Europe. The militarization of the economic recovery
plan would provide the US with the mechanism to continue providing aid to
Europe after the Marshall plan’s expiration. Moreover, the close integration of
European and American military forces would produce a means to prevent Europe
from closing itself off from American exports and capital (Block, 1977: 103–104).
The State Department directed the rearmament program to solve the many
intertwining political and economic problems that kept Europe from fully partic-
ipating in America’s global plan. Central to this approach was overcoming the
‘dollar gap’, which historian Curt Cardwell (2011: 58–59) defines as ‘an interna-
tional balance-of-payments crisis’ that ‘threatened to destroy the nascent global
economy’. By tripling defence spending, the program boosted the industrial sector
and neutralized the stagnating levels of employment. It boosted European indus-
tries, extended through the Korean War to solve Japan’s dollar gap (Borden,
1984). Military spending ignited investment in Europe and Japan, raising export
demand that the US industrial sector needed. The State Department reinvigorated
Keynesianism with military spending in ways that further limited the scope of
social change. Much like the expansion of the American industrial sector during
World War II, military Keynesianism greatly expanded the power of industrial
corporations. It provided them with a shield against the danger of economic dis-
ruptions during periodic contractions.
The militarization of the American and European economies represented the
definitive shift in the balance of power in favour of capital vis-a-vis the working
classes. Simultaneously, the political and business leaders could celebrate their
authority as if it represented a new pact that provided workers with new levels of
affluence and prosperity. New forms of consumption among the working classes,
militating against the protective aspects of labour organization, further weakened
their ability to combat capital, which would prove fatal during the 1970s as Euro-
American capital ramped up its project of exporting capital to the global south.
Conclusion
Critics of neoliberalism have dramatized contemporary politics as if they represent
a dangerous break or rupture in Euro-American societies. However justified, this
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alarmism relies on idealistic views of Keynesian economic policies of the post-war
era. By venerating and conflating full employment policies with welfare provision,
these critics fail to consider how the Keynesian reorganization of capitalism estab-
lished many of the conditions from which neoliberalism has flourished. With little
interest in class compromise, Keynesian state managers understood essential flaws
in the organization of capitalism. They deployed these insights to stabilize eco-
nomic conditions in ways that allowed massive corporations new opportunities to
expand their power globally. Many of the problems that critics detail as the out-
come of neoliberalism––corporate power, militarization and imperial control of
the ex-colonies––were essential to Keynesianism of the 1950s and 1960s. Rather
than a compromise, this new matrix of power supplemented an expanding domes-
tic security apparatus with social reforms that resulted in a dialectic of repression
and reform. The government subjected the working classes to new forms of con-
trol, making labour unions weaker and more vulnerable to corporate power,
including the export of capital and dismantling labour protections that would
follow the late 1970s. These policies steadily weakened organized labour, and
more problematically, transformed its desires through mass consumption and cel-
ebration of capitalist affluence.
A critical view of Keynesianism, which assesses rather than accepts the mythol-
ogies of class compromise, is crucial for a critical theory of contemporary capital-
ism and a more thorough analysis of neoliberalism. We should not interpret the
dominance of corporations, the militarization of the global economy, the massive
power of finance capital, Western control of multilateral institutions, the danger-
ous rise of inequality and the acceleration of ecological degradation as a radical
break with post-war forms of capital accumulation. Instead, we should understand
how these troubling forms of power and dominance grew from actually existing
Keynesianism. As we seek better ways to theorize contemporary capitalism and its
reckless tendencies that are destroying the planet, we must place Keynesianism,
and its practices of power, in this picture of capitalist ruin. The mythology of
Keynesian compromises feeds the idea that ‘neoliberalism’ is a particularly malev-
olent form of capitalism, leading us to believe that we can be saved by elites and
their new plans while taking our attention from the critical study of capitalism in
its continually shifting forms.
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1. My analysis has benefitted from several researchers who engage with and develop the
concept of neoliberalism (see Collier, 2011; Kalb, 2012, 2013; Slobodian, 2018). These
writers have described how state power and multilateral organizations have changed
global capitalism without glorifying post-war capitalism. Despite these sharp criticisms
of conventional views of neoliberalism, these writers have missed the opportunity to
connect contemporary economic processes with Keynesianism.
2. In this analysis, I draw on well-known criticisms of the welfare state that emerged in
the 1950s and 1960s. From the Miliband and Poulantzas debate, to trenchant analyses
of Perry Anderson, Mario Tronti, the Frankfurt School among many others
(Anderson, 1965; Horkheimer and Adorno, [1947] 2002; Miliband, 1969;
Poulantzas, 1978; Tronti, [1966] 2019). These divergent criticisms highlighted how
Western Europe and the US used Keynesian economic policies to create highly
unequal societies, contributed to monopoly capitalism, and proliferated vacuous
‘mass cultures’ based on consumption, subordinating working-class desires and
values to capitalist accumulation. I find it interesting that many critics of neoliberal-
ism, who know this research and understand the negative forces of post-war capital-
ism, have not been able to incorporate these well-known insights into their criticisms
of contemporary capitalism. Many theorists of post-Fordism and neoliberalism have
become wedded to narratives of contemporary decline and social rupture so that they
are obliged to overlook the critical lessons from these well-known analyses of post-war
inequality and political repression. To be sure, this literature is not sufficient and needs
many important updates.
References
Abrams P ([1977] 1988) Notes on the difficulty of studying the state. Journal of Historical
Sociology 1(1): 58–89.
Ahamed L (2009) Lords of Finance: The Bankers who broke the world. New York: Random
House.
Anderson P (1965) The left in the fifties. New Left Review 1/29(1): 3–17.
Baca G (2004) Legends of Fordism: Between myth, history, and forgone conclusions. Social
Analysis 48(3): 169–178.
18 Anthropological Theory 0(0)
Baca G (2010) Conjuring Crisis: Racism and Civil Rights in a Southern Military Town.
New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Baca G (2017) Neoliberal narratives of crisis: The feeble cries of a vanishing ‘class’.
Dialectical Anthropology 41(3): 377–385.
Barenberg M (1993) The political economy of the Wagner Act: Power, symbol and work-
place cooperation. Harvard Law Review 106(7): 1379–1496.
Beck H (1997) The Origins of the Authoritarian Welfare State in Prussia: Conservatives,
Bureaucracy, and the Social question, 1815-70. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Bhambra G and Holmwood J (2018) Colonialism, postcolonialism and the liberal welfare
state. New Political Economy 23(5): 574–587.
Bhattacharya T (2017) Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping class, Recentering oppres-
sion. London: Pluto Press.
Block F (1977) The Origins of International Economic Disorder: A Study of United States
International Monetary Policy from World War II to the Present. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Blyth M (2002) Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the
Twentieth Century. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Borden W (1984) The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese
Trade Recovery, 1947–1955. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Brenner R (2006) The Economics of Global Turbulence: The Advanced Capitalist
Economies from Long Boom to Long Downturn, 1945–2005. New York and London:
Verso.
Callinicos A (2009) Imperialism and Global Political Economy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Cardwell C (2011) NSC 68 and the Political Economy of the Early Cold War. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Collier S (2011) Post-Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Collins R (1981) The Business Response to Keynes, 1929–1964. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Clark C (2012) After 1848: The European revolution in government. Transactions of the
Royal Historical Society 22(1): 171–197.
Crotty J (2019) Keynes Against Capitalism: His Economic Case for Liberal Socialism.
London: Routledge.
Dumenil G and Levy D (2004) Capital Resurgent: Roots of the neoliberal revolution.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Esping-Andersen G (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
Fletcher L (2016). The collapse of the Western World: Acheson, Nitze, and the NSC
68/Rearmament Decision. Diplomatic History 40(4): 750–777.
Fraser N (2014) Behind Marx’s hidden abode: For an expanded conception of capitalism.
New Left Review 86(1): 55–72.
Friedman J (1994) Cultural Identity and Global Process. London: SAGE.
Harvey D (2007) A Brief History of Neoliberalism. London and New York: Oxford
University Press.
Horkheimer M and Adorno T ([1947] 2002) Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical
Fragments. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
Judt T (2006) Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945. New York: Penguin Books.
Baca 19
Kalb D (2012) Thinking about neoliberalism as if the crisis was actually happening. Social
Anthropology 20(3): 318–330.
Kalb D (2013) Financialization and the capitalist moment: Marx versus Weber in the
anthropology of global systems. American Ethnologist 40(2): 258–266.
Keynes JM ([1919] 2019) The Economic Consequences of the Peace. Cham: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Keynes JM ([1931] 1963) Essays in Persuasion. New York and London: WW North &
Company.
Keynes JM (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. London:
Macmillan.
Laidler D (1999) Fabricating the Keynesian Revolution: Studies of the Inter-War Literature
on Money, the Cycle, and Unemployment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Latham R (1997) The Liberal Moment. Modernity, Security, and the Making of Postwar
International Order. New York: Columbia University Press.
Lichtenstein N (2003) Labor’s War at Home: The CIO in World War II. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press.
Luff J (2013) Commonsense Anticommunism: Labor and Civil Liberties Between the World
Wars. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Luff J (2017) Covert and overt operations: Interwar political policing in the United States
and the United Kingdom. American Historical Review 122(3): 727–757.
Mann G (2017) In the Long Run We Are All Dead: Keynesianism, Political Economy, and
Revolution. New York and London: Verso Press.
Mann G (2019) Socialism’s biggest hero is a bourgeois British capitalist. In: Foreign Policy
Blog. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/05/keynes-keynesian-socialism-big
gest-hero-bourgeois-british-capitalist/ (accessed 6 December 2019).
Mazower M (1997) The policing of politics in historical perspective. In: Mazower (ed) The
Policing of Politics in the Twentieth Century: Historical Perspectives. New York:
Berghahn Books, 241–256.
Mezzadri A (2019) On the value of social reproduction: informal labour, the majority world
and the need for inclusive theories and politics. Radical Philosophy 2(1): 33–41.
Miliband R (1969) The State in Capitalist Society. New York: Basic Books.
Mitchell T (2011) Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil. New York: Verso
Books.
Neveling P (2017) The global spread of export processing zones and the 1970s as a decade of
consolidation. In: Andersen K and Müller S (eds) Changes in Social Regulation: State,
Economy, and Social Protagonists since the 1970s. Oxford: Berghahn Books, 23–40.
Ong A (2006) Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty.
Durham: Duke University Press.
Panitch L and Gindin S (2012) The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of
American Empire. London and New York: Verso Press.
Plotke D (1996) Building a Democratic Political Order: Reshaping American Liberalism in the
1930s and 1940s. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Poulantzas N (1978) Political Power and Social Classes. London: Verso.
Powers R (1987) Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover. New York: The Free Press.
Reyna S (2016) Deadly Contradictions: The New American Empire and Global Warring.
New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books.
20 Anthropological Theory 0(0)
Roberts M (2017) Keynes, civilization and the long run. In: The Next Recession. Available
at: https://thenextrecession.wordpress.com/2017/03/27/keynes-civilisation-and-the-long-
run/ (accessed 20 June 2019).
Schmidt R (2004) The Red Scare: FBI and the Origins of Anti-Communism in the United
States, 1919–1943. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press.
Skidelsky R (1992) John Maynard Keynes: The Economist as Saviour, 1920–1937.
New York: Penguin.
Skidelsky R (2003) Johns Maynard Keynes: Economist, Philosopher, Statesman, 1884–1946.
New York: Penguin.
Skocpol T (1980) Political response to capitalist crisis: Neo-Marxist theories of the state and
the case of the New Deal. Politics Society 10(2): 155–201.
Slobodian Q (2018) Globalists: The End of Empire and the Beginning of Globalization.
Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.
Steil B (2013) The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and
the Making of a New World Order. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Steinmetz G (1993) Regulating the Social: The Welfare State and Local Politics in Imperial
Germany. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Stoler A (2006) On degrees of imperial sovereignty. Public Culture 18(1):125–146.
Stoler A andMcGranahan C (2007) Refiguring imperial terrains. In: Stoler A, McGranahan
and Perdue P (eds) Imperial Formations. Santa Fe: SAR Press, 3–39.
Tronti M ([1966]2019) Workers and Capital. London and New York: Verso Press.
Van der Pijl K (2012) The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class. London and New York:
Verso.
Wacquant L (2012) Three steps to a historical anthropology of actually existing neoliber-
alism. Social Anthropology 21(1): 66–79.
George Baca is a professor of anthropology in the Graduate School of
International Studies at Dong-A University in Busan, South Korea, and serves
on the editorial committee for the journal Dialectical Anthropology. He is the
author of Conjuring Crisis (Rutgers University Press) and co-editor of Empirical
Futures (University of North Carolina Press). Baca is currently writing a book on
South Korean post-development politics tentatively titled The Making of Hell-
Joseon: Korean Nationalism, the Politics of Globalization, and Alienation.
Baca 21
